

### A Critical Analysis of Counterparty Credit Risk and CVA in a Basel III World

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




The Different Guises of CVA December 2012

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CVA Capital Charges: A comparative analysis

November 2012

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**Credit spread mapping** 

**Comparison of default risk capital charges** 

**Impact of Basel III** 



- IFRS 13 (1st January 2013)
  - "The entity shall include the effect of the entity's net exposure to the credit risk of that counterparty or the counterparty's net exposure to the credit risk of the entity in the fair value measurement when market participants would take into account any existing arrangements that mitigate credit risk exposure in the event of default" (CVA)
  - Non-performance risk includes, but may not be limited to, an entity's own credit risk" (DVA)
- Exit price concept
  - Explicit that own credit must be incorporated into the fair value measurement based on the concept of "exit price"
  - Exit price implies the use of risk-neutral default probabilities



- BCBS Consultative document (December 2009)
  - "Roughly two-thirds of CCR losses were due to CVA losses and only about one-third were due to actual defaults. The current framework addresses CCR as a default and credit migration risk, but does not fully account for market value losses short of default."
- BCBS Basel III text
  - "Banks will be subject to a capital charge for potential mark-to-market losses (i.e. CVA) associated with a deterioration in the credit worthiness of a counterparty."

$$CVA = LGD_{mkt} \sum_{i=1}^{T} max \left( 0; exp \left( -\frac{s_{i-1}t_{i-1}}{LGD_{mkt}} \right) - exp \left( -\frac{s_{i}t_{i}}{LGD_{mkt}} \right) \right) \left( \frac{EE_{i-1}B_{i-1} + EE_{i}B_{i}}{2} \right)$$

- BCBS "Application of own credit risk adjustments to derivatives"
  - "the Basel Committee is of the view that all DVAs for derivatives should be fully deducted....."

### **Overview of counterparty risk related capital charges**



	Default Risk Capital Charge	CVA Risk Capital Charge
Banks with IMM approval and with specific risk VAR approval for bonds	Higher of IMM capital charge based on EAD calculated with a) standard calibration b) stressed calibration Note : IMM approval will typically not cover 100%	Advanced method: • uses banks VAR model for bonds to model spreads • eligible hedges (CDS, CCDS, indices) can be included • sum of normal and stressed VAR • CVA formula below must be used $CVA = (LGD_{MKT}) \cdot \sum_{i=1}^{T} Max \left( 0; exp \left( -\frac{s_{i-1} \cdot t_{i-1}}{LGD_{MKT}} \right) - exp \left( -\frac{s_i \cdot t_i}{LGD_{MKT}} \right) \right) \cdot \left( \frac{EE_{i-1} \cdot D_{i-1} + EE_i \cdot D_i}{2} \right)$
Banks with IMM approval only	of trades	Standardised method:
Other banks	<ul> <li>Sum of EAD's from:</li> <li>current exposure method</li> <li>standardised method</li> <li>shortcut method (collateralised)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>K = 2.33 ·√h · √(∑<sub>1</sub> 0.5 · w<sub>1</sub> · (M<sub>1</sub> · EAD<sub>1</sub><sup>total</sup> - M<sub>1</sub><sup>hedge</sup>B<sub>1</sub>) - ∑<sub>nel</sub> w<sub>hed</sub> · M<sub>hed</sub> · B<sub>hed</sub>)<sup>2</sup> + ∑<sub>1</sub> 0.75 · w<sub>1</sub><sup>2</sup> · (M<sub>1</sub> · EAD<sub>1</sub><sup>total</sup> - M<sub>1</sub><sup>hedge</sup>B<sub>1</sub>)<sup>2</sup></li> <li>Variance type formula assuming 50/50 split between idiosyncratic and systematic spread components</li> <li>Hedges included but index hedges gives only moderate capital relief</li> </ul>

### The Different Guises of CVA




	Default Probability	Exposure	DVA
Accounting	<ul> <li>If CVA is seen as a reserve then real <ul> <li>Historical (or blended) default</li> <li>Historical volatilities and correl</li> </ul> </li> <li>If CVA is seen as a market price then <ul> <li>Credit spread implied default</li> <li>Market implied volatilities and</li> </ul> </li> <li>Current accounting rules (IAS 39 / FA)</li> <li>IFRS 13 requirements over exit price relevant for the calculation of default</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Currently mandatory (FAS 157) or optional (IAS39)</li> <li>Future IFRS 13 requirements make DVA mandatory for all banks</li> </ul>	
Front-office (for pricing)	<ul> <li>Typically risk-neutral (spread based) even if bank's accounting CVA is defined historically</li> <li>May charge based on historical (or blended) but then ignore DVA</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Typically risk-neutral exposure</li> <li>Real world simulation if used will probably be a facet of using older PFE type systems for CVA calculations</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Typical price will include some (but not all) of the DVA (not with real world default probs)</li> </ul>
Regulatory (CVA VAR)	<ul> <li>Risk-neutral (Basel III clearly defines CVA with respect to credit spreads)</li> <li>Mapping methods are important</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Real world parameters for simulation (IMM), or implicitly in other methods (e.g. CEM)</li> <li>Risk-neutral approach consideration for IMM banks to get better alignment</li> <li>Additional of stressed VAR component creates misalignment</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Not allowed (no DVA offset in calculation of CVA VAR)</li> </ul>



# **Credit spread mapping**

# **Comparison of default risk capital charges**

# **Impact of Basel III**




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### Mapping Approach – European Names



• Example categorisation for European counterparties






# **Credit spread mapping**

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# **Impact of Basel III**




- Simple approaches to define EAD directly
  - Current exposure method (CEM), standardised method, shortcut method
  - Limitations is potentially overcapitalisation due to inherent simplicity and misalignment of capital requirements with actual economic risk
- Under IMM, exposure can be calculated more directly and EAD is defined as:
  - Alpha factor × Effective EPE
  - Some conservativeness and misalignment potentially introduced via alpha factor and definition of Effective EPE



### Capital Charges – CEM vs. IMM For Single Swaps




### Single interest rate swap



### **Capital Charges – Impact of Netting**



### Portfolio of two swaps





# **Credit spread mapping approaches**

## **Comparison of default risk capital charges**

## **Impact of Basel III**




- Similar to market risk VAR rules under "Basel 2.5"
  - Calibrations using historical data quiet period tend to precede crises, creating procyclicality
  - Basel 3 defines that a "stressed" calibration must be used in addition to standard calculation
  - Data must be 3-years with 1-year period of stress (increasingly spreads)
  - EEPE is defined by the **max** of the normal and stressed calculations
  - Note that this is in addition to the stress period for CVA VAR (see later)
- Does switching to a risk neutral calibration solve the problem?
  - No must use a "stressed risk-neutral calibration" also

### **Modelling Collateralised Exposures**



Shortcut method can be rather conservative 






- The important parameter, the margin period of risk was previously required to be (at least) 10 business days for OTC derivatives portfolios
- Margin period of risk increased in the following cases
  - Netting sets with more than 5,000 trades at any time during a quarter (20 days)
  - Illiquid collateral or OTC derivatives that are hard to replace (20 days)
  - Two or more collateral disputes in last two quarters (at least doubled)
- Disallow rating triggers
  - Under IMM, cannot model any benefit from taking (more) collateral linked to a deterioration in credit quality
  - These tend not to work and create cliff edge effects

### Margin Period of Risk




IMM impact of margin period of risk of 20-days (zero threshold)





### Impact of Collateral on Exposure



20


### Motivation for CVA VaR



- Capitalise mark-to-market losses for counterparty risk (CVA volatility)
  - Two thirds of the actual counterparty risk losses in the crisis
- Criticism
  - Some smaller banks see CVA as a reserve or provision and not a market value
- Challenges
  - CVA is very hard to define with no market standard (models, parameters)
  - Clearly a computational challenge (CVA is complex, VAR is complex)
  - How to give capital relief (single name hedging, index hedging, securitisation)
- Exemptions
  - CVA VAR to CCPs (Basel III)
  - European sovereigns (CRD IV)
  - CVA VAR to non-financials?




- Normal distribution VAR approach based on the standard deviation of CVA
  - 99% confidence level, 1-year time horizon
  - Including single-name and index hedges
- Start with exposure to each counterparty (hedged with single name CDS)



- EAD may be defined by
  - Current exposure method (MtM + add-on)
  - Standardised method
  - Shortcut method (collateralised trades)
  - IMM method (EEPE  $\times$  alpha) maximum of normal and stressed scenarios



- Index hedges (systematic risk) driven by a standard normal variable  $V_{ind}$  and counterparties driven by another normal variable:  $V_i = \rho V_{ind} + \sqrt{1 - \rho^2 \varepsilon_i}$ Note: this implies counterparty – counterparty spread correlation of  $\rho^2$
- The standard deviation of the portfolio would then lead to:



- $\rho = 50\%$ , 99% confidence level (2.33 factor) and 1-year time horizon (h = 1)
- Volatility represented by weights (w) according to rating (or average rating for index hedges)
- Weights : AAA = 0.7%, AA = 0.7%, A = 0.8%, BBB = 1%, BB = 2%, B = 3%, CCC = 10%




Bank can model the VAR with their own models with CVA defined by:

$$CVA = LGD_{mkt} \sum_{i=1}^{T} max \left( 0; exp \left( -\frac{s_{i-1}t_{i-1}}{LGD_{mkt}} \right) - exp \left( -\frac{s_{i}t_{i}}{LGD_{mkt}} \right) \right) \left( \frac{EE_{i-1}B_{i-1} + EE_{i}B_{i}}{2} \right)$$
Loss given default Spread for time point EE (from IMM model) Discount factor

- Exposure profile is held fixed for simplicity
  - Only credit spreads are simulated
  - o Ignores other market factors (interest rates, FX, equity, commodity, .....)
- Other points to note
  - Separate to normal VAR calculations
  - Capital defined as **<u>sum</u>** of normal and stressed (wrt credit spreads) calculations
  - 10-day period, 99% confidence level, usual multiplier of 3

### CVA VaR – Advanced Approach (II)







- Single name CDS
  - Standardised approach offset according to EAD and maturity adjustment
  - Advanced approach offset calculated within VAR simulation (delta neutral?)
- Index CDS
  - Standardised approach as above but according to assumed 50% correlation
  - Advanced approach correlation can be modelled although "If the basis is not reflected to the satisfaction of the supervisor, then the bank must reflect only 50% of the notional amount of index hedges in the VaR"
- Structured credit
  - No benefit from other credit derivatives (tranches, nth to default structures)
  - Securitisations?
- Market risk hedges
  - Split hedge issue must be included in standard VAR calculation (unlike eligible hedges) and therefore will increase capital



# **Credit spread mapping approaches**

## **Comparison of default risk capital charges**

## **Impact of Basel III**


### **Comparison of Standardised and Advanced Approaches**



	Standardised	Advanced	Change
Time horizon, confidence level, other multipliers	1-year, 99%, no other multiplier = 2.33	10-days, 99% and standard VaR multiplier $2.33 \times \sqrt{10/250} \times 3 = 1.40$	$\checkmark$
Distributional assumptions	Gaussian	Empirical / Non-Gaussian	1
Exposure at default definition	Impact of crude approaches (e.g. CEM) and alpha factor in IMM	Use of EE directly should be smaller and give better alignment with CVA	$\checkmark$
Credit spread volatility	Introduced via the weights per rating category	Actual empirical data including stressed spreads may produce higher volatility	<b>个</b>
Spread correlation / portfolio effect	Counterparty spread implicitly assumed 50% idiosyncratic. Intra spread correlation implicitly 25%	Higher correlation likely leading to a worse portfolio effect due to undiversifiable systematic risk	1
Delta hedging capital relief	Likely underhedge due to conservative definition of EAD	Regulatory definitions better aligned with CVA producing better capital relief	$\checkmark$
Index hedging capital relief	Correlation is assumed to be 50%	Higher correlations can be used if they can be justified	$\checkmark$
Procyclicality	Spread parameters fixed through time	Spread parameters will change through the economic cycle	$\wedge \downarrow$

### **Examples – Standardised vs. Advanced Capital Charges**






5-year swap. CEM approach gives relatively small exposure and much lower capital charge.

### Single counterparty examples

5-year + 7-year swap. Off market and strong netting benefit. CEM approach gives relatively small exposure and much lower capital charge.




 Pricing required to cover CVA and achieve a return on capital (RoC) for swaps as a function of maturity (DVA ignored)



### **Impact of Single Name Hedges**



### 6-year swap (CVA VAR for standardised and advanced approximately the same)



#### Standardised approach

Delta hedge too small as EAD is relatively large under CEM approach. Capital relief very misaligned with CVA hedging.


#### Advanced approach

Delta hedge slightly too small due to need to use stressed data in EEPE calculation (assume all other components are aligned)

### **Impact of Index Hedges**



### 6-year swap (CVA VAR for standardised and advanced approximately the same)



#### Standardised approach

Capital relief poor due to misaligned delta and 50% correlation assumption.


#### Advanced approach

Delta hedge quite good giving almost 50% capital relief (80% correlation assumed).

### **Impact of Portfolio Effect**



#### Impact of increasing number of counterparties



#### Standardised approach


Significant portfolio effect. Hedging improves with size of portfolio. Idiosyncratic risk diversifies and systemic risk can be hedged.

#### Advanced approach

Portfolio effect poor with high correlation of 80% assumed (more systemic risk). Not clear if high correlation is beneficial or not for large portfolios.



- High index-counterparty correlation likely to be assumed
  - This allows better hedging efficiency and capital relief
  - However, it also implies less diversifiable idiosyncratic risk as counterparty counterparty spread correlation must also be high





- CVA charges and charges for CVA capital are comparable
- Advanced method generally gives higher capital charges than standardised
  - Most obvious driving force could be seen as need to add normal and stressed CVA VaRs
- Single-name hedging is misaligned with delta hedging
  - Much better in advanced approach where only stressed EEPE creates a problem
- Index hedging seemingly better in advanced approach
  - Since index counterparty correlations can be argued to be much higher than the 50% in the standardised case
  - However, this is not completely clear as this limits diversifiable idiosyncratic risk
- Important questions for the future
  - Will Basel III incentive the right kind of hedging?
  - Is CVA VaR unraveling already with the issues with the advanced approach together with the need for exemptions?